Reformulating the Distinction
The division between positive and negative rights, as well as positive and negative freedom, is one of the most pervasive distinctions in political philosophy. However, this distinction is not as rigid as it may seem at first glance. On closer examination, it becomes apparent that the separation between these categories is an illusion, masking the deeper interconnection between them. To understand this, let us first explore how positive rights can be reformulated as negative rights, and vice versa, through concrete examples.
Consider the right to healthcare. In many political frameworks, this is considered a positive right, as it requires the state or another entity to provide a service. However, this right can just as easily be reformulated as a negative right: the right to not be denied access to healthcare, or the right to not be left to die from an illness. Here, what was initially a claim on an active provision becomes reframed as a claim to non-interference in one’s pursuit of health.
Conversely, consider a classic negative right, such as the right to free speech. On the surface, this seems to only demand non-interference: the state or others must refrain from limiting my ability to express myself. But upon closer inspection, free speech necessitates certain positive provisions to be meaningful. Without education, access to public platforms, or legal frameworks ensuring that speech is protected, this right remains hollow. Thus, the right to free speech implicitly demands a positive infrastructure to support the exercise of this right.
Alternatively, consider a negative right such as “the right to life” (the right to not be killed). This is simultaneously a positive right as well: the positive right to have the police actively intervene whenever someone is trying to murder you.
From this starting point, we can already see that positive and negative rights are not mutually exclusive categories, but different expressions of the same underlying principles. They are two sides of the same coin, and their opposition is one of perspective. This distinction dissolves further when we consider the nature of freedom itself.
True freedom cannot be neatly divided into “freedom from” (negative freedom) and “freedom to” (positive freedom). Both aspects of freedom are intertwined and co-constitutive. Freedom from external interference is essential for individual autonomy, but autonomy in itself is meaningless without the capacity to act in the world. Thus, negative freedom necessarily implies a positive dimension, and vice versa.
For example, freedom from coercion implies that one is not subject to the arbitrary will of another. But what is the point of this freedom if one lacks the material means or social conditions to exercise it? Conversely, the freedom to pursue one’s own goals requires a protective framework that shields individuals from outside interference. The freedom to do something meaningful requires the freedom from barriers that would otherwise prevent it.
Thus, freedom is always both positive and negative. Whether we focus on one aspect or the other depends on our perspective, not on any objective reality of what freedom “is.” In this sense, the distinction between positive and negative freedom is not an objective one, but a subjective lens through which we interpret the nature of human liberty.
Hegel’s Dialectic: Substance as Subject
To delve deeper into the subjective nature of the distinction between positive and negative freedom, we must turn to Hegel’s philosophy and his concept of “substance as subject.” According to Hegel, reason operates dialectically. This means that reason involves the negation of appearances in order to uncover their hidden potential and develop them in a teleological manner — towards their true essence or purpose. In this process, what appears to be a fixed and objective reality (substance) is always already in relation to the subject, whose perceptions and actions reveal the potential latent within it.
The process of dialectical reasoning can show that any external, seemingly objective distinction between positive and negative rights, or positive and negative freedom, is ultimately a product of subjective reasoning. Reason negates the initial form of appearance to reveal its internal contradictions and to develop it toward its true nature. In this context, the distinction between positive and negative freedom is an initial appearance that reason negates in order to uncover a deeper unity between them.
Objective reality (substance) becomes modified by the subject’s perception and action, not in a purely subjective or relativistic sense, but in a way that reveals the latent potential within the objective structure. This is where Hegel’s concept of dialectics as a process of development comes into play: the movement of thought reproduces the movement of being and brings it to its true form.
This brings us to the teleological development of freedom. Freedom, in Hegel’s view, is not simply a matter of escaping constraints (the typical liberal conception of negative freedom), nor is it simply a matter of achieving one’s aims through social provisions (the standard conception of positive freedom). Rather, freedom implies the realization of the subject within the substance — the realization of the individual within the broader social and ethical world. The two aspects of freedom, positive and negative, must be seen as part of the same developmental process.
The teleological purpose of freedom, according to Hegel, implies the realization of the subject in substance — the individual within the objective structures of ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit). The process of realizing freedom involves uncovering the hidden potential of what we initially understand as negative rights and transforming them into positive rights.
This process is dialectical. It begins with an initial negation of the external world through the framing of freedom as a negative right. For example, we begin by asserting a right to be free from interference (such as the right to free speech or the right to property). This negation reflects the desire of the subject to carve out a space free from external constraints.
But this is only the first step in the dialectical process. This negation is itself negated when we recognize that the negative right is not enough to fully realize freedom. The right to be free from interference requires the positive conditions to exercise that right meaningfully. In the case of the right to life (the right to not be murdered), the negation of interference must be followed by a positive provision — such as the creation of social structures like the police to actively intervene when someone tries to take away this right from you. In this way, the negative right to life becomes reformulated as a positive right, and the dialectical movement continues.
Thus, the dialectical method reveals that what we initially perceive as a negative right is always already imbued with a positive aspect. The distinction between negative and positive rights is not an objective reality but a subjective framing that dissolves upon closer inspection.
Reconciliation of Individual and Collective Freedom
The culmination of this dialectical process is the reconciliation of the individual and the collective within the framework of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). For Hegel, concrete freedom is not merely the absence of constraints, but the participation in a rational social order that allows individuals to realize their true nature within the family, civil society, and the state. It is through these social institutions that individuals come to understand their place within the universal good, and it is within these institutions that freedom is realized as concrete, rather than abstract.
Concrete freedom involves the unity of the individual and the collective in their difference. This is crucial: Hegel’s dialectical method does NOT follow the simplistic formula of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis”. The dialectic does not end in a synthesis in which the individual and the collective are merged into a new entity. Rather, the dialectic ends in a reconciliation, in which the individual and the collective remain united in their difference. Both maintain their autonomy, but they are now seen as part of a larger whole — an organic totality in which their freedom is realized.
This is the key to understanding how Hegel’s dialectic applies to the distinction between positive and negative rights and freedom. The individual’s freedom (often framed in terms of negative rights) and the collective’s demands (often framed in terms of positive rights) are not opposites that must be synthesized. Instead, they are united in their difference. The individual realizes their freedom not by escaping the collective, but by finding their place within it. Similarly, the collective does not subsume the individual, but provides the framework in which the individual’s autonomy can be actualized.
To summarize: the distinction between positive and negative rights, as well as positive and negative freedom, is an appearance created by subjective reasoning. These categories, far from being fixed and objective, are intertwined expressions of the same fundamental concept of freedom. The dialectical method reveals that what we initially perceive as negative freedom (or rights) contains within it the seeds of positive freedom. This movement from negative to positive is a teleological development that ultimately leads to the reconciliation of the individual and the collective within the framework of ethical life.
Thus, the illusion of the distinction between positive and negative rights and freedoms is dispelled through the dialectical method. Freedom is not one or the other; it is both, and neither at the same time. It is the unfolding of reason in history, the realization of the individual within the collective, and the reconciliation of autonomy and ethical life.
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This article is an excerpt from my new book, “Freedom and Ideology”. You can read the book on Amazon by clicking on this link.
